What is Intersectionality Theory? Explained

What is Intersectionality Theory? Explained

In the previous post we learned about Dalit Feminism. This post mostly focuses on feminist thought as it examines the post and perspective of intersectionality as well as gender and intersectionality theory. It also examines how intersectionality came to be in the late 1980s, when there was a desire to acknowledge and comprehend black women's experiences. It further defines a comprehension of the various intersectionalities and differences that affect women's lived experiences. In addition, the programme examines some of the intersectionality's criticisms and aims to show how intersectionality theory and practise naturally involve discussion and self-reflection.

Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Understanding Intersectionality
  3. The context of emergence of intersectionality
  4. Intersectionality and its relevance and popularity
  5. Some Critiques
  6. Summary

Introduction

In the world of academia, intersectionality is a crucial theoretical idea, notably in feminist thought. It is referred to be the "most significant contribution that women's studies has made so far" by Kathy Davis (2008). Therefore, it is vital to comprehend what intersectionality means, where it came from, and how it is used in the current situation.

In order to gain a better knowledge of the concept, its significance, and the discourses around it, this blog will explore the meaning of intersectionality, mostly through feminist literature. The history of the phrase and how it came to be used in the international academic community will be discussed first. After that, a critical examination of the meaning of a phrase like intersectionality will follow. The blog will also look at how, if at all, the theory of intersectionality assists in developing a better understanding of the world around us, particularly women's lived realities, especially marginalised women, after looking at some of the criticisms of "intersectionality" that have been made.

Understanding Intersectionality

‘Intersectionality’ as defined by Kathy Davis (2008), 
“refers to the intersection between gender, race, and other categories if difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcome of these interactions in terms of power”.
In order to better comprehend how multiple power systems, such as caste, class, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and so on and so forth, interact with one another to form a layered environment in which all lives and experiences play out, intersectionality can be used as an example. For example, in a patriarchal society, a woman from a higher caste and class might be in a worse situation than a man from the same community, but in a caste-based society, she would be in a better position than a dalit woman. The same woman would be in a marginalised position within the heteronormative power structures of society if she later came to identify as a lesbian. This is another illustration of how intersectionality manifests itself in day-to-day life. There are numerous such instances that demonstrate how we all spend our lives inside frameworks that place us in marginalised positions in certain circumstances and in privileged positions in others. One approach to recognise and comprehend these shifting positions of power is through intersectionality.

The context of emergence of intersectionality

Kimberle Crenshaw coined the phrase "intersectionality" for the first time in 1989. Three cases were used by Crenshaw, a Black feminist lawyer, to demonstrate how Black women's experiences were frequently misunderstood in court as resulting from the combination of race and gender. According to Crenshaw (1989), there is a propensity to "consider gender and race as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis," which leads to a lack of understanding of Black women's perspectives. She goes on to note that Black women's experiences were frequently only understood if they overlapped with the experiences of either "Black males or white women," using the incidents she provides to support her claim.

She contends that the adoption of a single axis framework for analysis and understanding is to blame for the lack of understanding of Black women's experiences. According to Crenshaw, the single axis analysis of subordination or discrimination views subordination as a disadvantage that occurs along a single category axis (Crenshaw 1989). Because it restricts inquiry to the experiences of the group's ordinarily privileged1 members, the single axis framework also poses a conceptual issue because it "erases the black women in the conceptualization, identification, and remediation of race and sex discrimination" (Crenshaw 1989). Crenshaw asserts that because of the single axis analysis and the complexity of black women's experiences, these experiences are not included in the analytical categories. This is such that the single axis analysis can't account for the variety of ways that Black women are discriminated against. Because of this, the examination of race and sexuality is limited to only covering a small portion of a much more complicated phenomena.

Crenshaw continues to develop her fundamental claim, which is that racism and sexism alone cannot fully account for the intersectional realities of black women. It must therefore be understood through an analysis that considers this intersectionality. She criticises the antiracist and feminist theories of the time and makes the point that if these theories want to address the issues faced by black women, they must reconsider and recast the frameworks used to describe "women's experience" or "black experience" (Crenshaw 1989).

Intersectionality and its relevance and popularity

Despite the fact that Crenshaw coined the phrase "intersectionality" in 1989, it has subsequently been used widely and in a variety of situations. It has even started to take on the appearance of a buzzword. It is crucial to comprehend the reasons that intersectionality gained such traction in academia, not just among feminists but also among non-feminists.

Reflecting on the reasons why intersectionality gained traction, Kathy Davis (2008). Using the work of Murray S. Davis from the discipline of sociology of science, who had "explored what permits a certain social theory to capture the imagination of a large audience of academics," Davis discusses the "spectacular success" of intersectionality (Davis 2008). According to M.S. Davis, it didn't matter whether a certain theory was "good" or "coherent" when discussing the numerous conversations surrounding intersectionality, the ambiguity, and the various opinions of how it should be conceptualized2. As opposed to this, he believed that "successful theories thrive on ambiguity and incompleteness."

According to M.S. Davis, K. Davis believes that an effective social theory must meet four criteria. In doing so, she demonstrates how intersectionality has been able to address some of the major problems in feminist theory. She utilises them to elaborate on the many parts of intersectionality. According to Davis, the first requirement is that a good feminist theory should concentrate on a "pervasive and essential issue." According to her, the admission of women's differences is "the most essential theoretical and normative concern within feminist studies," and this is addressed by the notion of intersectionality. "Two of the most significant streams of contemporary feminist thought that have been, in various ways, preoccupied with the subject of difference," according to Davis, are brought together by intersectionality. Understanding the "impact of race, class, and gender on women's identities, experiences, and the fights for empowerment" is the focus of the first of these strands. The second trend is one that rejects universalism and is motivated by postmodern theoretical perspectives for deconstructing binary oppositions. According to Davis, intersectionality "seemed to embody a commitment to the situatedness of all knowledge (Haraway, 1988), promising to enhance the theorist's reflexivity by allowing her to incorporate her own intersectional location in the production of self-critical and accountable feminist theory" because it "helped in conceptualising multiple and shifting identities" (Davis 2008). What Davis is trying to say is that by using intersectionality, a researcher may engage in feminist theory while acknowledging their own position in relation to the multiple power systems and use their location as a resource for analysis rather than merely as a means of identification. She also emphasises that intersectionality "allows an implicit reassurance that the focus on difference will not make feminist theory outmoded or useless" in her reflection on intersectionality's appeal (Davis 2008). In essence, she is saying that because intersectionality allows for difference and the use of one's location as a resource for analysis, it also permits feminist engagement with issues outside of one's social location. This opens the door for feminist research to continue being relevant in modern contexts and frees the researchers from being constrained by specific identity markers.

According to Davis, an effective feminist theory needs to make "provision for novelty" as her second criterion. Therefore, even if the issue at hand is an old one, a successful social theory must be able to offer a fresh approach to solving it. For instance, Davis noted that one issue with feminist studies was the clash between postmodern theory and critical feminist theory, which sought to analyse the impacts of sexism, racism, and classism (critical of universalism and binary identities). She explains that while postmodern theory was "critical of many of the notions borrowed by theorists of race, class, and gender—for example, experience, viewpoint thinking, and identity politics—there were still theoretical and methodological incompatibilities. Poststructuralist feminist theory, on the other hand, has come under fire from race, class, and gender theorists for failing to pay enough attention to the practical effects of these categories of difference on the lives of women of colour (Davis 2008).

The theory of intersectionality visibalizes the "social and material ramifications of the categories of gender, race, and class" while employing approaches that are compatible with the "poststructuralist objective of deconstructing identities." A theoretical and methodological conundrum in feminist studies is therefore creatively resolved by giving "a common nodal point." A good social theory should appeal to both generalists and specialists in the field, according to Davis' third criterion. She argues that as intersectionality gained popularity, the generalists (researchers) got interested in it, and at the same time, as numerous theoretical arguments erupted around it, the experts also became interested in it (the theoreticians). She also makes the very important point that intersectionality forced generalists to reclaim theory as an essential component of feminist inquiry, forcing specialists to ground their meta-concerns in the concrete social and political contexts of women's lives. This provided a much-needed bridge between feminist researchers and feminist theorists (Davis 2008).

A good social theory should be fundamentally ambiguous and open-ended and beg for additional examination and elaboration, according to Davis' last criterion. She considers the various debates surrounding intersectionality and, rather than viewing them as a sign of the theory's inadequacy, she views them positively. She emphasises that these disagreements and ambiguity allow one to enhance and challenge the theory of intersectionality, which makes it more well-liked. Incompleteness, she continues, "may drive an academic audience to develop or 'test' the theory by applying it to other areas of social life that were not covered in the original theory," provided ambiguity stimulates synthesis (Davis 2008). She thinks that intersectionality is also applied in many and diverse academic areas because of the theory's ambiguity and open-endedness.

Examining Davis' four parameters is important because she demonstrates how the intersectionality theory responds to the fundamental issue of feminism in politics and academia—the recognition of difference. She also demonstrates how the intersectionality theory offers a fresh approach for two strands of feminist theorising to interact while maintaining the relevance of both, rather than only addressing the issue of not recognising difference. She also demonstrates how the theory of intersectionality and the numerous debates around it have been able to close the gap between theory and researcher since it has captured the interest of both "specialists" and "generalists." Finally, Davis emphasises that the theory's very ambiguity and open-endedness, which are frequently criticised and can make it frustrating at times, is also the reason it has permeated so many academic spaces and, as a result, creates the possibility of a dialogue among different academic disciplines.

Some Critiques

A hotly debated topic is intersectionality theory. Numerous criticisms of the theory are inevitable given how widely it is applied. Although it is impossible to discuss every type of intersectionality criticism in this module, some of them have been highlighted.

Lola Okolosie claims that there is still a very narrow understanding of the term "intersectionality" despite the fact that many feminist spaces claim to use it. The fact that more feminists are recognising the importance of intersectional spaces, according to her, is a "testament of the hard work of feminists critiquing a lack in intersectional feminist praxis." It is necessary to "ensure that intersectionality becomes integrated into feminist discourse beyond the level of language, and into something more profound" because, in her opinion, "listing of difference does not in and of itself create the possibility of systematic change; it does not ensure that we ourselves do not replicate some of the damaging values of our dominant culture" (Okolosie 2014). By using intersectionality without fully embracing the idea and developing an understanding, Okolosie is suggesting that even in feminism spaces, unequal structures can be furthered.

In the context of online spaces, she explains that while social media and online spaces have been crucial tools in many cases for enabling black feminist voices and concerns to take a centre stage and not just remain at the edges of "mainstream" feminism, it frequently results in black feminists having to defend intersectionality in these online spaces. She focuses particularly on the UK. Therefore, rather than being a result of black feminist scholarship, "intersectionality is described and discussed as being synonymous with black feminism" (Okolosie 2014). That is extremely harmful, in her opinion, because it not only requires black feminists to "explain" themselves, which can be emotionally taxing in and of itself. Because it also suggests that intersectionality is used in black feminist activist spaces, which isn't always true, it is harmful. She emphasises the significance of realising that, in addition to gender and race, other intersections of oppression can be overlooked even in activist spaces. She writes, "As black feminism is positioned as the space that 'houses' intersectionality, we too are prone to overlook other intersections of oppression, however unintentionally. For the majority of our discussions about the term and concept, gender and race become the main foci. In our "safe spaces," things like ability, sexuality, age, nationality, and class—which is frequently treated as implicated in our experience as members of ethnic minority communities—become marginalised (Okolosie 2014). Here, Okolosie makes an important criticism. In order to prevent feminist spaces from speaking for and/or co-opting the "voices of those absent from the metaphorical 'table' of feminist analysis," she seeks to demonstrate how practising intersectionality still requires ongoing self-reflection. She acknowledges that intersectionality is challenging work, but contends that it necessitates a commitment to our individual activist spaces for inviting others in the larger movement to collaborate with us and ensuring that the voices of those who occupy various marginalised identities are not silenced.

A critique of intersectionality in the Indian context is also provided by Nivedita Menon. She bases her criticism of intersectionality on the notion of the "Imperialism of categories," by which she implies that while it is common to believe that concepts formed in the global north have universal applicability, this is never the case for ideas developed in the global south. She contends that in what she refers to as the "global south," the "Single Axis framework" was never dominant or uncontested. She concluded that the term "intersectionality" in this situation did not contribute anything new to understanding. She uses the Indian nationalist fight as an example to illustrate her point, pointing out that leaders at the time created identities "not via the idea of individual citizenship but through that of communities—caste, religious, and ethnic groups,” engaging with multiple identities. Additionally, caste, communal, and queer politics have consistently questioned even the term "Woman" and its homogeneity. Thus, in her view, intersectionality does not offer a fresh or radically new paradigm for comprehending society. Additionally, intersectionality is merely a new word given for an idea that has always existed and been politicised due to the prevalent imperialism of categories.

Another objection raised by Menon (2015) is that, rather than feminism, the term "intersectionality" appears to be used to describe governmental policies and international financing organisations. By doing so, she is implying that the term has lost much of its "destabilising potential" as a result of being appropriated by the language of governance due to its popularity. According to her, by presuming a pre-existing woman who is carrying several identities, intersectionality "helps execute the role of governmentalizing and depoliticizing gender in international human rights discourses" (Menon 2015). Meena Gopal (2015) and Mary John have both addressed Menon's critiques of intersectionality (2015). One would like to point out that it is crucial to consider these responses because they demonstrate the value of conversation in feminist scholarship and because, because Gopal and John also make reference to the Indian context, they provide a more comprehensive understanding of intersectionality in India.

Menon, according to Gopal, "misrepresents a topic that was extensively contested in western context and makes it appear like an elites-versus-subalterns issue" by oversimplifying the significance of intersectionality in the Indian context (Gopal 2015). Contrarily, John notes that intersectionality is "very self-consciously not-new" and "references a past legacy with roots reaching all the way back to the 19th century." She adds that "this kind of approach, where a phrase is closely identified with particular histories of collective struggle rather than with the person or people who really originated it, is highly uncommon" (John 2015). She also adds that even when issues were acknowledged, they weren't always dealt with or engaged with, in reference to Menon's argument about accepting difference. It is historical fact, she says, that women's organisations were unable to maintain their initial efforts toward a more inclusive politics (John 2015). John also makes the point that any interaction with the state and its policies has a great deal of potential to lead to positive change because they are a regime that cannot be avoided.

Finally, John (2015) adds his thoughts to Menon's reference to the "imperialism of categories," saying, "I, therefore, believe that-at least in the 21st century- we will need a much more multilayered notion than a simple imperialism of categories to be able to capture the ways in which subordinated peoples have been able not just to make sense of their worlds, but also to fight back." In addition, she uses the example of disability in India to highlight how it "cannot be disentangled from the agendas of international agencies, whether it be the UN year of disabled persons in 1981 or the pressure to sign the 2006 convention on the Rights of persons with disabilities" as a "new paradigm for activism and scholarship (compared to the prior frame of the handicapped) (John 2015).

Through these and other more critiques of intersectionality, one can see that while it is a contentious area with built-in ambiguity (as Davis noted), it is also a field where an ongoing conversation is taking place. The theory can develop and be tested in numerous contexts thanks to this discussion. Therefore, it is important to view the criticisms favourably since they allow feminist discourse and ongoing self-reflection on the theory of intersectionality.

Summary

In conclusion, it is clear that since emerging in the late 1980s, the idea of intersectionality has grown in importance on a global scale. This is due to the fact that it has allowed feminist scholarship to engage with diversity and advance toward respectful solidarities. It has drawn a lot of scholarly attention, which has also prompted a range of criticisms. However, these criticisms aid in the theory's development and allow it to be evaluated against many sectors; as a result, they are as much a part of intersectionality as the theory itself.

Reference

  1. Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black feminist critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist politics." University of Chicago Legal Forum, no. 1 (1989): 139-167. 
  2. Davis, Kathy. "Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Socilogy of Science Perspective on What makes a Feminist Theory Successful ." Feminist Theory, 2008. 
  3. Gopal, Meena. "Struggles Around Gender: Some Clarifications." Economic and Political Weekly L, no. No. 33 (2015). 
  4. John, Mary. "Intersectionality: Rejection or Critical Dialogue." Economic and Political Weekly L, no. No. 33 (2015). 
  5. Menon, Nivedita. "Is Feminism About 'Women'? : A Critical View on Intersectionality from India." Economic and Political Weekly L, no. No. 17 (2015).

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